Throughout Germany’s early history, the country has always been defined by strong and authoritarian leadership. The autocratic leadership dates back to the unification of Germany in 1871 under Otto von Bismarck and his creation of a romantic-like conservatism through ‘heroic’ leadership and nationalism. Kaiser Wilhelm II continued this throughout his reign and, particularly in the Great War, where he was portrayed as a strong and heroic leader with a closely protected public image. However, as the war dragged on, this cult of personality was transferred to the likes of Paul von Hindenburg, and the Kaiser became a mere figurehead. Historian Ian Kershaw has described nationalistic unity around the likes of Bismarck as a ‘cult .’ It was a great manifestation in the Nazi’s rise to power, where propaganda chief Joseph Goebbels sought to closely shape Adolf Hitler’s public image by presenting him as a bold, strong, and heroic leader that would resonate with German nationalists in the Weimar Republic, as it reminded them of the customs of the old, against the wishes of the Weimar democracy. For Hitler’s time as Führer of Germany (1933–1945), historians are divided on whether Hitler was a ‘strong leader’ with a compelling hold on power or a ‘weak dictator’ with an ineffective hold on power. Historian Ian Kershaw argues the former; he argues that by Hitler encouraging competition among his subordinates, he held his sole power as Führer and made his will unquestionable, hence, a ‘strong leader.’ He lied on propaganda to propagate the narrative:
On the other hand, historian Edward Peterson argues the latter; he argues that Hitler was lazy and rarely made decisions, but power was really held by his subordinates who could convince Hitler to approve of their actions, hence ‘weak dictator.’
After the First World War, Hitler became much more involved with the fledgling German Workers’ Party transformed into the Nazi Party, which set the tone for the formation of the Sturnabteilung (SA) paramilitary. After World War I, Germany faced poor economic conditions, political instability, spiralling unemployment, and profound social change, which made Germans struggle to understand their uncertain future. The current dissertation will argue that Hitler was a ‘weak dictator’ rather than a ‘strong leader.’
Germany, as a fascist state, used propaganda machinery that was brought under the control of one organization or a group of related organizations as a helpful measure to eliminate democracy. The dictator, Hitler, was brought into power by Fascist Germany using propaganda, which helped convince the people of the National Socialist solution.[1] The National Solutionist policy was postulated as the solution to Germany’s political and economic problems. The army of storm troops targeted the opposition through terrorist methods, which made it difficult and dangerous for the competing propagandas that were propagated. The argument of Hitler being a ‘strong leader’ comes from several aspects – the use of propaganda, the internal decision-making and power of the Nazi government, and the seizure of power for Hitler. The Führerprinzip, translated to ‘Leader Principle,’ was the structure of the sole executive of Nazi Germany. This system dismantled the structure of elected officials and civil servants built by the Weimar Republic. Instead, it replaced every civil authority in Germany with a Nazi-appointed leader who was, more than anything else, loyal to and unquestionable to the will of Hitler himself. Historian Ian Kershaw has explained this as such by stating that the ideology of Nazism can be sufficiently dubbed as ‘Hitlerism.'[2] The Führerprinzip was portrayed in Nazi propaganda as the central element of German society; this, in combination with similar propaganda efforts centred around Hitler, created the idea that “the Führer is always right.”[3] Hence, Hitler was a ‘strong leader’ in that he was considered the leader of all elements of German society, and everyone involved was unquestionably loyal to him, ensuring that he held a firm hold on power at all times. It is argued that Hitler was a ‘weak dictator’ in that he governed and made decisions on a whim. It stems from how Hitler made tiny, tiny decisions himself. Still, he would instead assemble his subordinates and give a speech on what his overall vision was and what he wanted to happen, which would become known as the ‘Führer’s will.’ In this, the details were interpreted by his subordinates, who would then take it as a guideline to their respective places of power within Nazi Germany and use it to produce the results that would best please Hitler, and ambitious individuals looking for greater power would attempt to gain Hitler’s attention by pleasing him as much possible and predicting his will. Otto Dietrich, Hitler’s press chief, published in his memoirs that he created a government of confusion that lacked organization and was fueled by conflicts to interpret and fulfil Hitler’s will alone.[4] However, Historian Ian Kershaw argues that Hitler, in fact, had a clear plan and objectives that he wanted to achieve throughout his entire time as Fuher and that his ideological beliefs defined his decisions. Hence, it could be argued that Hitler was being a ‘strong leader’ by determining the direction and governance of the Nazi organization.
The propaganda, epitomized by “The Triumph of the Will,” played a pivotal role in shaping perceptions of Hitler’s leadership. While it effectively cultivated a cult of personality around Hitler and facilitated the regime’s control over public opinion, it also masked the inherent weaknesses and vulnerabilities of Hitler’s dictatorship. Despite projecting an image of strength and unity, Hitler’s reliance on propaganda underscored his insecurities and the fragility of his hold on power. Therefore, while Hitler may have appeared as a ‘strong leader’ in the eyes of his supporters, the pervasive use of propaganda reveals the underlying weaknesses of his dictatorship, ultimately casting doubt on his legacy as an effective ruler. Propaganda played a crucial role in shaping public perception of Hitler’s leadership[5]. By controlling the narrative and manipulating images, the regime projected an aura of invincibility and strength around Hitler. “The Triumph of the Will” presented a carefully curated version of reality, depicting mass rallies and military displays designed to evoke a sense of national unity and purpose. The film’s propagandistic techniques, such as selective editing and dramatic cinematography, elicited an emotional response from viewers, fostering loyalty and allegiance to Hitler. However, while propaganda succeeded in mobilizing support among specific segments of the population, it also obscured the harsh realities of Nazi rule, perpetuating a myth of German superiority while concealing the regime’s atrocities.
The policy of “divide and rule” used by Hitler within the Nazi Party can be cited as a reason why he was a strong leader. The policy meant that members of the political party competed against each other on every issue to see who would come up with the best solution. The party member who came up with the best solution rose through the ranks and received special privileges, while the loser was disgraced and stagnated or demoted in rank. The idea by Hitler to use “divide and rule” is based on the concept of social Darwinism. According to Carr, Hitler thrived on the chaos and uncertainty rive within the party as it encouraged power struggles.[6] There are many examples of fierce rivalries resulting in animosity towards members who were supposed to be of the same party. The strategy made Hitler a master of the Third Reich because the party members were busy fighting each other rather than making a bid for the party leadership. Consequently, Hitler was able to consolidate power as the ultimate leader of the Nazi Party and Germany. Kershaw notes that Hitler preferred the government to be in a state of confusion and uncertainty.
Conversely, historians, including Momsem, argue that Hitler did not use the “divide and rule” policy intentionally. Furthermore, it shows that he was incapable of making strategic decisions, which made him a weak dictator. Goebbels’s diaries render support to this assertion as he offers numerous examples of Nazi party members who took action on various issues without obtaining the Fuhrer’s approval first. Within the Nazi party, it seems some members were powerful and took charge of routine decisions, such as in the case when Goebbels ordered attacks on the foreign press on 27th May 1939 without the Fuhrer’s authorization.[7] The argument is that if Hitler were, in fact, a master of the Third Reich, then every significant decision would have gone through him first.
Another example is Hitler’s involvement in the final solution. Although Hitler bears much of the blame for the occurrence of the holocaust, there are other members of the Nazi party, such as Himmler, who have admitted a large part in the atrocity. In fact, the holocaust can be largely attributed to the complex structure of decision-making within the Nazi party rather than Hitler himself. Many decisions were made by the Nazi party rather than Hitler himself, showing that he was a weak dictator or he was unable to control his party.[8] The result is that senior members of the Nazi party are able to take advantage by ignoring orders and making decisions that are more suited to their wishes.
An example is 18th and 19th March 1945, when his orders were ignored by the troops who were ordered to fight without any food or supplies. The decision to dismiss the order to march and fight renders support to the argument that Hitler was a weak dictator rather than a strong one. In fact, there had been attempts on Hitler’s life in the past by members of his Nazi party, such as in July 1944.[9] The numerous attempts on the dictator’s life can be attributed to the divide-and-rule policy as it left some members of the Nazi party aggrieved and not in tandem with the Fuhrer’s vision. Hence, he asserted that he was a weak dictator as he was unable to control his party, let alone the nation.
Regardless, some historians, such as Bracher, believe that Hitler adopted the “divide and rule” policy on purpose. The Nazi party was divided into many organizations that were not under the direct control of the Fuhrer but other members who would compete with each other. Bracher argues that Hitler embraced this chaotic structure to ensure he was the ultimate authority to solve problems arising within the system. Hitler fostered chaos and confusion in government in his time as ruler of Germany, ultimately resulting in a despotic tyranny. For example, there was confusion in the education system, which was a crucial pillar of the Nazi regime. There was Baldur Von Schirach, the man in charge of the Hitler Youth, and Bernhard Rust, the minister of education, with both men claiming to be at the centre of the system.[10] The Historians who believe the chaos and confusion in government were intentional say that Hitler’s power arose from having the final say in the fighting between his subordinates. The subordinates worked towards gaining access to the Fuhrer, encouraging fierce competition, which reflected Hitler’s social Darwinist belief that the best and most efficient individuals would come out on top.
Structuralist and functional school of thought, however, point to the inability of Hitler to organize the hierarchy of the state and Nazi party as a weakness.[11] He was a weak dictator because he failed to give the state and the party a proper direction. The structuralists blame the disorganized and chaotic nature of the German state on Hitler because he failed to create order in the first place. Therefore, there was no unity within the Nazi party as subordinates competed to gain fervour with the Fuhrer. Consequently, the mass murders and the holocaust happened as a result of the environment that prevailed due to there not being any real leadership at the top. While the intentionalists suggest that Hitler and a few of his loyal henchmen were responsible for atrocities, such as the holocaust, the structuralists emphasize “cumulative radicalization” as playing a bigger role. The radicalization of the masses seemed to take on a momentum of its own and, at some point, even appeared to write Hitler out of the script completely. Ian Kershaw, in his biography of Hitler, offers a more complex look at the dictator’s persona as a supreme leader and the far-from-streamlined power structure of the system.[12] Kershaw notes that Hitler’s role as a charismatic Fuhrer was as a result of the Nazis carefully and relentlessly cultivating the position’s public image. The Nazis distributed images of Hitler in heroic postures, and Hitler himself rehearsed his speeches by practising his posture and gestures. Consequently, the Nazis were able to create admiration for the Fuhrer among millions of Germans who may otherwise not have subscribed to the Nazi ideology, according to Ian Kershaw.
Historian Ian Kershaw argues that the government of Nazi Germany was, in fact, far more disorganized than previously suggested. He argues that quite often, several German ministries could be working towards the same goal. Still, they would refuse to cooperate and even work against each other in order to be the ones to please Hitler, which he often permitted and even encouraged in order to produce the best results. For example, the Ministry of Propaganda headed by Joseph Goebbels and the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda clashed as they sought to influence the public in diverse ways. Another example is the Ministry of Economics and the Ministry of Armaments and War Production, which were in conflict over resource allocations and production priorities.[13] Kershaw argues this as a strategy of “divide and conquer” where Hitler would encourage such competition in order to produce the best results but also to ensure that his power would remain undermined by his subordinates by disallowing greater cooperation between them if the command structures of the Nazi party and ministries were not overly clear.
In most cases, the ministries operated independently, seeking to please the Fuhrer rather than working in harmony, resulting in inefficiencies and contradictory policies. However, it is also argued that Hitler was less concerned about siding with those who could produce the best results and those who were the most powerful and could exert the most influence. By doing this, he is ensuring that the interests of the people who can undermine his power interests are protected so that they remain loyal to Hiter himself. Hitler’s management style can be described as a weak dictatorship because he encouraged such competition owing to his fear that one ministry could become too powerful.[14] Thus, it is argued that Hitler was reliant on these select few subordinates in order to maintain his power and ensure its protection. Hence, he was an ineffective leader, as the results that were produced often needed to be improved for what was best. However, this could be interpreted as Hitler maintaining the strategy of ‘divide and conquer’ by actively encouraging competition among his subordinates so that they do not cooperate too greatly in order to undermine Hitler’s power or produce sub-par results for him, and by doing this he is ensuring that his say remains a top priority and that he maintains his hold on power. Hence, Hitler could be considered a ‘strong leader’.
Contrary to Intentionalist historians, such as Norman Rich argue that Hitler was a master of the Third Reich, structuralists emphasize that he was a weak dictator due to personal inadequacies and the limits imposed by the Nazi party and state. For example, Mommsen argues that Hitler was a weak dictator in many ways, while David Irving even describes him as probably one of the lowest leaders in Germany’s history. The personal inadequacies of Hitler are exemplified during the later stages of World War II as he refused to accept reality, adapt to changing circumstances, and failed to prioritize the well-being of his people.[15] His misguided ideological ambitions prolonged the war, increased human suffering, and ultimately led to the downfall of the Nazi regime. Hitler, as a child, was frail and sickly, never engaged in any manual work, and was emotionally dependent on his mother. He was turned down for conscription into the Austrian army, and in his four years in the military, he never rose above the rank of corporal. During World War II, he suffered hysterical blindness and war neurosis, leading to frequent emotional breakdowns characterized by yelling and weeping. His bad conscience resulted in nightmares and spells in which he lacked energy, confidence, and the power to make strategic decisions.
Although Hitler extolled admiration for pure, noble German blood and exhibited contempt for Jewish, Slav, and other bloodlines, he was not noble or beyond reproach. His origins are derived from a mixture of races that had pure or noble German blood among them.
The weaknesses in Hitler’s personality are exhibited in the latter stages of World War II, as shown by his denial of reality. As Germany’s military capacity waned and the Allied forces advanced on multiple fronts, Hitler refused to accept reality or grasp the gravity of the situation, dismissing any negative reports from his military advisors and intelligence services. He had no grasp of the problem and little empathy for his troops as he was not there doing the actual fighting, portraying himself as a weak dictator.[16] His ego drove him, and the high-ranking Nazi officers around him had no courage to challenge it. Instead of opting for a negotiated peace, Hitler was convinced he would still persuade the Western Allies to join him in the war against the Soviet Union. In the latter stages of World War II, Hitler was no longer mentally stable as he held onto the idea that the severely depleted German troops would be able to stop the Soviet advance. Hitler’s delusional and racist thinking led him to believe that the Russians were weak and incapable of mounting a defence.[17] Even when it was clear the Nazis were losing the war, he probably held onto the belief that Germany would arise from the ashes and that it was not he who had failed but the German people who had failed him.
Despite the dwindling resources and declining military strength of the Germany army, Adolf Hitler refused to adapt showing his inability to alter his strategic approach.[18] He held on to his expansionist goals and rejected any indications of a negotiated peace deal or a strategic retreat to consolidate German defenses. Examination of decision making in a crazy state, such as Germany under Nazi leadership, should begin with an investigation of its leader’s beliefs about politics. As shown through written materials, such as Mein Kampf the “Jewish problem” and the acquisition of Lebensraum in the East were constant ambitions in Hitler’s world view. The thoughts were inherent in the leader’s speeches during kampfzeit and after he assumed power. Walter Langer’s wartime psychological evaluation of Hitler as irrational is, therefore, accurate in many aspects even going further to use conjecture of monorchidism on the part of the Nazi leader. Langer observes “he does not think things out in a consistent and logical manner, gathering all relevant information, mapping out alternative courses of action, and then weighing the negatives and positives for each of them before reaching a decision.” Langer’s psychoanalytical examination notes that the Nazi leader’s mental processes operate in reverse arriving at a solution first before seeking for facts that will prove him correct. The thought processes proceed from the emotional to factual instead of starting with the facts.
Hitler was convinced that the Allies guarantee of Poland was no genuine.[19] The conviction was bolstered by the deviation from the unitary rational actor model of the organizational and political system. An example is Joachim Von Ribbentrop, the foreign minister, who reported that Britain was weak and indecisive. Reports, which Hitler was happy to receive as it reinforced his personal beliefs. Based on this misinformation, the British guarantee was perceived as a bluff countering it with tripartite alliance with Japan, Italy, and the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact. In Hitler’s opinion, the German-Polish war held no threat to the British and French interests.[20] These manifestations of cognitive dissonance enhanced the number and severity of consequences as the flow of events became more unacceptable. The Nazi leader held onto unrealistic prospects about Germany’s ability to turn the tide of war owing to his delusional expectations. The unrealistic outlook is further exemplified by Hitler’s unwavering believe in “miracle weapons,” such as the jet aircraft and the V-2 rocket to turn the tide of the war and reverse Germany’s fortunes.
Hitler’s micromanagement and interference during the latter stages of the World War II exemplifies the weak nature of his leadership. He had a habit of micromanaging military operations and overriding the decisions of experienced military commanders further impairing the German state’s ability to respond effectively during the crisis. The interference resulted in a disjointed and uncoordinated military strategy that wasted precious resources and manpower. It can be argued that the German generals were by and large were capable, talented, and capable, however, they experienced shortage in resources inside their borders, such as oil, steel, coal, and everything else as early as 1942.[21] Other compounding factors that made Germany to lose the war included their minimal surface fleet being too small and underdeveloped, their wartime production lagging behind that of the Allies, the refusal to allow women to work, and Germany did not have enough men to fight the war. After the Allies D-Day offensive combined with the Soviet offensive, Operation Bagration, the Germany army found itself fighting on multiple fronts resulting in the troops being pushed back into Germany. In the closing stages of World War II, Nazi Germany lacked strong leadership as Hitler lost faith in the German people rarely seen in public instead seeking shelter in his bunker under the Reich Chancellery in Berlin.[22] Hitler committing suicide on 30th April 1945 meant the end of Nazi Germany for many who had viewed Nazism and Hitler as one being.
Additionally, Hitler advocated for the use of a scorched earth policy in the face of imminent defeat. He ordered German troops to destroy infrastructure and resources in occupied territories to curtail the advancement of Allied forces. The destructive strategy exacerbated the suffering of the populace and the devastation wrought by the war. His isolation and paranoia further hindered his decision making during the crisis. He surrounded himself with loyalists who did not challenge any of his decisions. He insulated himself from dissenting voices and differing viewpoints resulting in a dangerous effect of reinforcing his delusions.[23] Therefore, Hitler’s failure in leadership during the World War II crisis arose from his inability to be in touch with reality, adapt to the prevailing circumstances, and put his people’s well-being over his flawed ideological ambitions. Hence, he was a weak dictator as his misguided decision making prolonged the war, increased human suffering, and led to the downfall of Nazi Germany.
Historians’ narrative on Adolf Hitler’s leadership often oscillates between two poles. There are those who view him as a formidable, authoritarian figure who commanded unwavering obedience and loyalty. Conversely, other historians portray him as a weak dictator whose erratic decision making and personal flaws resulted in the decline of Nazi Germany. They contend that his leadership was characterized by delusion and incompetence. One argument that showcases Hitler’s weaknesses is his overreliance on propaganda as a means of controlling the masses and consolidating power. The carefully crafted image of Hitler as an invincible and heroic leader masked the underlying vulnerabilities of his regime. The pervasive utilization of propaganda reveals Hitler’s desperation to hold onto power and his inability to inspire genuine support and loyalty devoid from manipulation. In addition, the strategy of “divide and conquer” within the Nazi party and state ultimately weakened his leadership rather than consolidating it. By fostering internal rivalries and encouraging competition among his subordinates, the Nazi leader created a dysfunctional and chaotic system of governance that undermined the coherence and effectiveness of his leadership. The lack of cooperation and coordination in the party factions and state ministries meant the implementation of cohesive policies were severely impeded contributing to contradictions and inefficiencies within the Nazi Germany government. Furthermore, Hitler’s failure to provide effective leadership during times of crisis, such as in the latter stages of the war exposed his incompetence and delusional thinking. The Nazi leader’s inability to accept reality, adapt to the changing circumstances, and prioritize the well-being of his people resulted in a prolonged war and exacerbated human suffering. Hitler’s interference in military operations, micromanagement, and advocacy for destructive strategies including the scorched earth policy further shows his inability to make rational decisions in the face of adversity. Overall, Hitler’s weak leadership style led to the downfall of Nazi Germany. His misguided decision making combined with flawed ideological ambitions resulted in disaster for the nation. The ineffective governance combined with his delusional beliefs and personal inadequacies made him incapable of propelling Germany towards a stable and prosperous future. While the Nazi leader may have projected an image of strength and authority through manipulation and propaganda, his leadership ultimately turned out to be façade. The image projected through propaganda and manipulation helped to conceal the inherent weaknesses and vulnerabilities of his dictatorship. Thus, the prevailing evidence overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that Adolf Hitler was indeed a weak dictator rather than a strong leader.
Aschim, J. (2020). Playing Hitler: The representation of Nazism in Hearts of Iron IV (Master’s thesis).
Benecke, J., & Link, J. W. (2022). Education under National Socialism: Ideology, Programs and Practice. Locus: Revista de História, 28(2), 64-100.
Bergen, D. L. (2023). Between God and Hitler: Military Chaplains in Nazi Germany. Cambridge University Press.
Breitman, R. (2022). The architect of genocide: Himmler and the final solution. Plunkett Lake Press.
Dellinger, J. (2021). Post-Revolutionary German Literature 1848-1888: Tracing Liberalism Through German Literary Realism (Doctoral dissertation, University of Oregon).
Dietrich, O. (2010). The Hitler I Knew: Memoirs of the Third Reich’s Press Chief. Skyhorse Publishing Inc.
Fox, W. T. (1985). EH Carr and political realism: vision and revision. Review of International Studies, 11(1), 1-16.
Görtemaker, H. B. (2022). Hitler’s Court: The Inner Circle of The Third Reich and After.
Jasper, J. M., Young, M. P., & Zuern, E. (2020). Public characters: The politics of reputation and blame. Oxford University Press, USA.
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Koonz, C. (2005). The Nazi Conscience. Belknap Press. Print.
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Kurlander, E. (2021). Adolf Hitler: From democracy to dictatorship (1889–1945). In Dictators and Autocrats (pp. 19-37). Routledge.
Loving Jr, R. (2022). Fat Boy and the Champagne Salesman: Göring, Ribbentrop, and the Nazi Invasion of Poland. Indiana University Press.
Mommsen, H. (2020). The Failure of the Weimar Republic and the Rise of Hitler. In The Burden of German History 1919-45 (pp. 116-130). Routledge.
Pfitzner, K. (2021). Politics in Battle: The Army and the State in the German-Soviet War (Doctoral dissertation, Wheaton College. (Norton, Mass.).
Poast, P. (2023). 6 Economics and War. Understanding War and Peace, 175.
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Schmider, K. (2021). Hitler’s Fatal Miscalculation: Why Germany Declared War on the United States. Cambridge University Press.
Yang, S. (2023). From Crisis to Consolidation: Hyperinflation’s Role in Hitler’s Rise and Germany’s Economic Resurgence. Journal of Student Research, 12(4).
Yelton, D. K. (2002). Hitler’s Volkssturm: The Nazi Militia and the Fall of Germany, 1944–1945. University Press of Kansas.
[1] Kurlander, Eric – Adolf Hitler: From democracy to dictatorship (1889–1945).
[2] Ian Kershaw – The Nazi Dictatorship, page 62
[3] Claudia Koonz – The Nazi Conscience, page 59
[4] Otto Dietrich – Twelve Years with Hitler
[5] Ian Kershaw – The Nazi Dictatorship, Page 63
[6] Edward, Carr – EH Carr and political realism: vision and revision, Page 1-16
[7] Claudia Koonz – The Nazi Conscience, page 60
[8] Breitman, Richard – The architect of genocide: Himmler and the final solution.
[9] Yelton, David K. – Hitler’s Volkssturm: The Nazi Militia and the Fall of Germany, 1944–1945.
[10] Benecke, Jakob, and Jörg-W. Link. – Education under National Socialism: Ideology, Programs and Practice
[11] Bergen, Doris -. Between God and Hitler: Military Chaplains in Nazi Germany.
[12] Yang, Seoyoung. – From Crisis to Consolidation: Hyperinflation’s Role in Hitler’s Rise and Germany’s Economic Resurgence
[13] Poast, Paul – Economics and War. Understanding War and Peace, page.175.
[14] Kurlander, Eric – Adolf Hitler: From democracy to dictatorship (1889–1945). In Dictators and Autocrats, Page 19-37
[15] Mommsen, Hans -The Failure of the Weimar Republic and the Rise of Hitler.” In The Burden of German History 1919-45, Page 116-130.
[16] Dellinger, Jake – Post-Revolutionary German Literature 1848-1888: Tracing Liberalism Through German Literary Realism. PhD diss.
[17] Jasper, James M., Michael P. Young, and Elke Zuern – Public characters: The politics of reputation and blame
[18] Schmider, Klaus – Hitler’s Fatal Miscalculation: Why Germany Declared War on the United States, Page 11.
[19] Ridley, Norman – Hitler and Poland: How the Independence of one Country led the World to War in 1939, Page 27
[20] Loving Jr, Rush – Fat Boy and the Champagne Salesman: Göring, Ribbentrop, and the Nazi Invasion of Poland, Page 123
[21] Pfitzner, Kiran – Politics in Battle: The Army and the State in the German-Soviet War. PhD diss, Page 120
[22] Aschim, Johannes – Playing Hitler: The representation of Nazism in Hearts of Iron IV
[23] Görtemaker, Heike B. – Hitler’s Court: The Inner Circle of The Third Reich and After