We will compare the thought experiments’ wide and narrow psychological criterion ratings. Each situation presents unique barriers to personal identification, and evaluating them will show how each criterion evaluates identity continuity. We will also discuss the defensibility of applying each criterion to these scenarios.
Brown Transplanted His Brain into Robinson’s Empty Skull
The psychological criterion stated by Wide adds that Brown’s brain is transplanted with originality. In contrast, the memory, character, and beliefs imbued in the brain remain; the man is Brown. With the prevalence of typical altruistic dispositions, Brown is conceived to be compelled even after physical transformations (Krauss et al., 2021). The narrow criterion can still decide that switching bodies means a new person was created, e.g., because Robison now has Brown’s whole brain. The notion of Brown’s suchness is based on the consideration that the same brain is to be regarded as the story’s real hero.
Since Brown’s current psychological features are as exact as those Robinson is running into in this case, according to the criterion, he will still be recognized as the survivor by having a broad psychological criterion. By emphasizing the constitutional role of psychological traits, we can claim that the personality outlives its inner changes (Krauss et al., 2021). Although the mind has evolved due to Robinson’s mental condition, the narrow criterion may challenge Brown’s determination. As this modification is a significant divergence from the numerical identity, the odds for the survival of Robinson become higher. Hence, the Narrow Criterion attaches more importance to the numerical identity of the brain, resulting in Robinson’s survival as an individual with the original brain, compared to the Wide Criterion, which stresses the continuity of psychological traits as the basis of the concept of self.
According to the Wide Psychological Criterion, the fact that these changes would lead to an individual possessing the psychological continuity of Brown in Brown’s mind would probably make us consider this person as Robinson (Anglim et al., 2020). Crusoe’s psychological features, however, despite his alienation, remain in that they evidence his still being alive. The brain now matches both Brown’s psychology and Robinson’s psychology, which satisfies the same brain’s statistical need, so Robinson’s persistence is also supported, and we would probably get the final psychological answer identifying Robinson as the survivor.
Based on the thin and wide psychological criteria, having Brown get through the conditions described in the scenarios seems problematic. The alterations created in Robinson and Dickenson’s brains are some habits that resemble Brown’s personality but have erased that person. We have concluded that Brown cannot be said to undergo perpetuation in the circumstances because none of the conditions for identity are met (Reynolds et al., 2023). This principle means that psychological variables cannot work independently of the anatomical qualities necessary to preserve identity after such extensive changes.
When it comes to this, the brain that correlates to Brown’s psychology will probably be the one to retain his body, regardless of whether the reprogramming is successful. Per psychologists, trait continuity would take precedence in line with broad and narrow psychological definitions. It implies that in that scenario, the choice of individual beings would be based on the extent to which their psychology would correspond with Brown’s, not on the type of brain undergoing modification (Krauss et al., 2021). It implies the importance of psychological continuity in identity definition by applying the criteria and stressing the importance of preserving the essential psychological characteristics for identity development.
There is a chance that Brown is not going to make it to his destination or might die during the psychological experiment based on the approximation and application of the P-Criteria test. It is not that Goldberg’s human copy includes the same cognitive properties; what entails the destruction of the body and brain beats the identity bond (Greenhall et al., 2023). The regulations could systematically consider continuity in the emotional and physical spheres, which leads to the resolution that the reproduced person is identical on an emotional level. However, the shape does not match the original person. Hence, the replica cannot be justifiably treated as a continuation of Brown’s whole identity by both definitions.
They are only two out of several perspectives on personal identity. However, they can give you an idea of personal identity with the broad psychological criteria that accept diversity and do not demand rigid adherence to the numerical identity that defines identity; the broad psychological criteria are more reasonable (Anglim et al., 2020). Facilitates a broader conceptualization of identity that includes the various psychological elements and the whole individual. However, we must critically reflect on these criteria to comprehend the limitations of this approach.
In summary, a balanced approach that considers both psychological continuity and physical structure may offer a more thorough knowledge of personal identity across various contexts, even though each criterion has advantages and disadvantages.
Anglim, J., Horwood, S., Smillie, L. D., Marrero, R. J., & Wood, J. K. (2020). Predicting psychological and subjective well-being from personality: A meta-analysis. Psychological bulletin, 146(4), 279.
Greenhall, G. H., Rous, B. A., Robb, M. L., Brown, C., Hardman, G., Hilton, R. M., … & Watson, C. J. (2023). Organ transplants from deceased donors with primary brain tumors and risk of cancer transmission. JAMA surgery, 158(5), 504-513.
Krauss, J. K., Lipsman, N., Aziz, T., Boutet, A., Brown, P., Chang, J. W., … & Lozano, A. M. (2021). Technology of deep brain stimulation: current status and future directions. Nature Reviews Neurology, 17(2), 75–87.
Reynolds, C. R., Altmann, R. A., & Allen, D. N. (2021). The problem of bias in psychological assessment. Mastering modern psychological testing: Theory and methods (pp. 573-613). Cham: Springer International Publishing.