The 1945 – 1968 period entailed frightful implications of shocking nuclear power, particularly following the detonation of the first nuclear bomb in world history. Despite being a trinity test that ended World War II, the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by America was a good representation of the first large-scale application of nuclear technology, which also ushered in a new age of technological development and sociopolitical thinking (Poleta, 2021). This era was full of geopolitical tensions between key global powers, such as between the Soviet Union and the United States and their various respective allies, the Eastern and the Western Bloc, which began right after the end of the First World War. The limited progress on the global nuclear disarmament efforts in this period and the potential of nuclear power raised many concerns globally, particularly with the limited progress witnessed towards nuclear power demobilization during the tenure of various American Presidents (Poleta, 2021). These include Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and President Lyndon B. Johnson, who faced criticisms for their policies that now appear as political miscalculations that resulted in America being unable to make any nuclear progress. Many American presidents from 1945 to 1968 concentrated on winning the Cold War, improving their Economic strength, and dramatically improving the country’s standard of living, which had been lowered during World War II (Schindler et al., 2023). Nevertheless, the United States could not make nuclear progress due to the many political miscalculations of the American presidents from 1945 to 1968 and the complex political landscape that existed in the country and the international arena. The paper explores how the paths of the Cold War, International relations and NATO allies resulted in the American presidents making political miscalculations, resulting in the inability to make nuclear progress.
Moreover, the materials included in this discussion weigh on how the Cold War and international relations policies from 1945 to 1968 resulted in the American president making political miscalculations hindering them from making nuclear progress.
The Cold War period from 1945 to 1968 goes down in history as a key era where many American presidents made many political miscalculations, which saw them unable to make nuclear progress in the country. The start of the Cold War changed the view of nearly every aspect of the country’s domestic politics as new post-war challenges and perceived threats have now risen to erode confidence in their success against Japan and Germany in 1945. Within this period, new tensions had emerged from the Cold War between America and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies (Frank, 2022). This new tension between these two world superpowers created great tension in America, and the communist insurrection was key in riveting domestic politics. This means that from 1945 to twenty years later, there was a rise of political tension in America concerning anti-communism and the Cold War despite bipartisan support for many U.S.U.S. foreign policy initiatives (Lynch, 2019). In this case, many presidents during this period made many miscalculations, such as deciding to concentrate on winning the Cold War instead of focusing on making progress in nuclear progress.
For instance, in 1947, the then-American president, President Harry Truman, made many policies in trying to reinforce and protect the new reforms that would guide the country towards economic restoration and try to advance African-American civil rights. This meant that he had to ignore the fact that America needed to make nuclear progress to match those of the other superpowers, such as the Soviet Union. For instance, he addressed Congress about making new policies regarding the Cold War to support U.S. allies, where he requested economic assistance to Greece and Turkey. Moreover, the defining challenges in international affairs during his years in the presidency show the deterioration of U.S. relations with the Soviet Union, which was a key mistake during his tenure. In his leadership, America also supported democratic institutions and market principles, meaning that all the focus was on rebuilding the American economy while, on the other side, forgetting to support nuclear progress, leading to the emergence of new nuclear superpowers in Asia and Europe (Lynch, 2019). For example, in 1949, Trauma’s administration came up with new foreign policies in trying to control the Soviet Union’s military strength and political powers, which continued to divide the two superpowers.
This was a major miscalculation for President Truman due to the fact that, instead of America making nuclear progress to match those of the Soviet Union, the post-war efforts posed a difficult transition to America. For example, there was too much concentration on the nation’s economic policies, such as wages, production and controlling prices (Frank, 2022). The successful testing of the Soviet Union’s atomic bomb in 1949 came as a shock to the United States during Trauma’s administration, which placed too many resources on the country’s economic recovery instead of nuclear progress. The Soviet Union’s tested atomic bomb had an equivalent in yield to the atomic bomb that America had dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima years later. This was a shock to America and President Truman, who had believed that due to the escalation of the Cold War between the two powers, the Soviet Union was several years behind in terms of nuclear progress (Frank, 2022). In addition, the lack of quality intelligence in America during Truman’s leadership made way for the Soviet Union to spy on American nuclear programs. For example, the German émigré Fuchs had already been passing information about America’s little progress in nuclear energy to the Soviet Union, who applied it to their advantage.
President Harry S. Truman’s miscalculations on the Soviet Union’s capabilities in nuclear power and too much concentration on economic policies in the country resulted in America’s failure to make any nuclear progress. In a worded and surprisingly low-key statement, President Truman had to inform the American citizens of the Soviet Union’s nuclear accomplishment, which was thought to be impossible by many, creating huge tension in the U.S.U.S. government and Truman’s administration as it was believed to be the country’s great asset (Lynch, 2019). This meant that in their concentration on economic prosperity in the post-war era, it would take the Soviet Union many years before they could assemble an atomic bomb of their own. Instead of continuing with nuclear progress, all resources were focused on economic prosperity and helping its allies economically (Frank, 2022). The rise of the Soviet Union in terms of nuclear technology forced President Truman to re-evaluate all of America’s policies developed during the Cold War through the country’s Security Council, as there was already an atmosphere of uncertainty and fear in America.
The complex web of alliances, such as NATO and America’s international relations efforts, acted as a key miscalculation from President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his administration. For instance, in the 1950s, the alliances brought in a huge dilemma in relation to the Nuclear Proliferation problem. The American alliances, such as NATO and the complex web of international relations, were spearheaded by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who spearheaded the efforts of massive retaliation limiting America’s nuclear progress (Iplikci, 2019). This was seen in the Vietnam War, where Eisenhower was questioned on his administration’s policy of massive deterrence and retaliation towards nuclear weapons. Since 1945, America has committed to supporting France, particularly in its efforts to protect its colonial existence in the Indochina region, both economically and militarily (Iplikci, 2019). In 1953, America and France were forced to adopt the Navarre strategy in an attempt to avert the Communist-led Viet Minh takeover of Indochina. It was in 1953 that Henri Navarre, the French general, established a large military base in northwestern Vietnam with high hopes of trying to lure the Viet Minh into war.
During this period, America’s National Security Council (N.S.C.) and government advisors believed that the only way to help the French military win this battle was through nuclear bombs, an idea that was rejected by President Eisenhower, arguing that these weapons were not appropriate to be applied in a limited conflict such as the Viet Minh conflict and that the results could damage American international image. This was a major miscalculation by President Eisenhower as it questioned his administration’s policy of making nuclear progress in America and staying ahead of the Soviet Union. Many claimed that using nuclear bombs during this period could have been a successful policy toward keeping the Cold War in balance and stopping the military and economic advancements of the Soviet Union in Western Europe (Iplikci, 2019). Moreover, due to their massive destruction, President Eisenhower doubted the utility and wisdom of relying on the atomic bombs, resulting in America making little progress during his time (Morrissey, 2019). In this case, retaliating against the use of nuclear bombs lost the value of nuclear progress in America during this tenure. Despite Eisenhower concern’s, the Soviet Union’s nuclear developments prompted America to expand and continue with its nuclear capabilities in trying to match this superpower.
Nevertheless, President Eisenhower later stressed the need for massive retaliation among the NATO allies to counter the growing threat of the Soviet Union’s nuclear power aggression, a policy whose goal was to reduce the need for big conventional forces in America (Iplikci, 2019). However, massive retaliation raised more concerns around Europe, specifically from the NATO allies, who saw nuclear escalation as an opportunity for America to strengthen its security over that of the NATO allies. Overall, America’s attention to the Vietnam War absorbed much of its resources and attention, which limited the country’s efforts to make any nuclear progress during this time.
John F. Kennedy (1961-1963) faced the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, resulting in many miscalculations that derailed the nuclear progress in America. Right after failing to overthrow the Cuban government under Castro with the Bay of Pigs Invasion, President John F. Kennedy planned Operation Mongoose. While the United States planned this operation under Kennedy’s leadership, the Soviet Union leader, Premier Nikita Khrushchev, came into an agreement with Cuban leader Fidel Castro to place their nuclear arsenal in Cuba in an attempt to prevent any invasion in the future (Kiger, 2019). The construction of nuclear missiles continued, and later, America’s intelligence discovered Soviet arms build-up in Cuba, where President Kennedy issued warnings to the Soviet Union against its introduction of nuclear weapons in Cuba. Despite the warning, American U-2 airc5afts took pictures showing intermediate and range nuclear missiles (IRBMs and M.R.B.M.s) under construction in Cuba. Government advisors, including the Joint Chief of Staff, proposed an air strike in Cuba, which would destroy the nuclear missiles, while others proposed stern warnings to both the Soviet Union and Cuba. However, President John F. Kennedy decided to apply a middle path. On 1962 October 22, he ordered a naval quarantine on Cuba, enabling America to receive support from its allies as it legally differentiated this action from a blockade. In its response statement, the Soviet Union stated that this was an act of aggression that placed the crisis in a Virtual stalemate, forcing President John F. Kennedy to give diplomatic channels a chance (Kiger, 2019). This meant that America could not use its nuclear missiles during this time, meaning that there was no nuclear progress as there were no attempts to apply the bombs in Cuba. In addition, the Soviet Union proposed that America remove its Jupiter missiles from Turkey. In contrast, John F. Kennedy’s message proposed that the Soviet Union remove its nuclear missiles from Cuba under the supervision of the United Nations (Kimball, 2023). This act appeared to be part of the public resolution of the nuclear missile crisis between the two superpowers, as on October 28, the Soviet Union agreed to remove and dismantle its nuclear missiles from Cuba.
Despite ending the crisis, the American naval quarantine continued in Cuba until the Soviet Union removed all its IL-28 bombers from Cuba. On November 20, 1962, America ended its naval quarantine in Cuba and removed all its Jupiter missiles from Turkey in April 1963. This crisis between the two superpowers stood as a key event during the Cold War and strengthened President Kennedy’s image locally and globally (Kiger, 2019). However, the failed Bay of Pigs invasion was a key miscalculation by President Kennedy as it meant that America could not make any nuclear progress during this time as they tried to come up with resolutions to end the crisis peacefully. Instead, the diplomacy efforts between President Kennedy and the Soviet Union started to reconsider the nuclear arms race, which was key in coming up with the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. On October 7, 1963, President Kenndy signed the Test Ban, which prohibited all nuclear weapons tests or other major explosions in the atmosphere, underwater, or even in outer space, which was a major miscalculation during his tenure as it meant that the United States could not make any nuclear progress during this period (Kiger, 2019).
Moreover, the pledged signatories from both the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to work towards complete nuclear disarmament, which was to mark the end to the armaments race and an end to the contamination of the environment by the nuclear radioactive substances derailing American nuclear. In this case, President Kennedy’s nuclear disarmament policy, therefore, made it hard for America’s nuclear progress as he believed that the ban could prevent other countries from obtaining nuclear weapons (Kimball, 2023). While he took a strong stand on this policy even in his 1960 presidential campaigns, Kennedy’s military and political advisors continued to believe that the Soviet Union had continued with its nuclear testing, making more gains in nuclear technology than America.
President Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-1968) made some political miscalculations that resulted in America’s inability to make nuclear progress. Upon his entry into office, President Lyndon B. Johnson inherited Eisenhower and Kennedy’s policies of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) of nuclear weapons. MAD doctrine acted as a national security policy and also a military strategy, which posited that a full-scale application of nuclear bombs by an attacker with a nuclear-armed defender with other various second-strike abilities would definitely result in complete annihilation of both the defender and the attacker (Germany, n.d.). In this case, the MAD policy created unstable and dangerous nuclear environments all over Europe. In this case, the result of the MAD policy was nuclear peace, which resulted in a decrease in the presence of nuclear weapons since all nations in Europe, together with the Soviet Union, had decided to avoid any crisis escalation as all parties wanted to avoid any situations that could force them to apply nuclear weapons against each other (Morrissey, 2019). In this case, President Lyndon, among the key proponents of the nuclear peace policy in America and its allies, believed that a controlled nuclear proliferation policy was key to international stability. The MAD doctrine also required that neither side should construct nuclear shelters of massive power or scale as they would destabilize the peace situation, resulting in unacceptable loss from all sides. In addition, President Lydon, as a proponent of MAD with the U.S.S.R. strategic doctrine, believed that nuclear war could be limited when all sides slowed their nuclear progress as there was no need for any side to invest more in their nuclear arsenals than they did not intend to use.
In general, President Lyndon’s major political miscalculation led to America’s inability to make nuclear progress, as he focused more on maintaining the balance of power with the Soviet Union instead of mobilizing more resources to improve America’s nuclear capabilities. Moreover, President Lyndon’s political interests in Vietnam made America not have any progress in nuclear technology as he believed that the country had enough soldiers and that the escalation of the American presence in this country was the only solution to win the war.
In conclusion, from the above discussion, the political miscalculations made by the American presidents from 1945 to 1968 greatly impacted America’s inability to make any relevant nuclear progress compared to the Soviet Union. The intense Cold War between America and the Soviet Union resulted in President Truman mobilizing all resources towards the country’s economic reconstruction, which was a key political miscalculation as the Soviet Union was able to progress with its nuclear effort. For instance, when the Soviet Union explored its nuclear test range in Kazakhstan, America was caught off-guard as it believed that the Soviet Union was at least three years away from obtaining nuclear technology. In addition, with the nuclear arms race being the most alarming feature of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and America, the presidents during this period had to sign nuclear arms control agreements as a means to manage their rivalry, which meant that the United States could not make any nuclear progress during this period. Additionally, the Cuban Missile Crisis created more tensions between America and the Soviet Union, which saw the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, agreeing on the ban of nuclear tests, limiting America’s nuclear progress during this period. This made other powers, such as China and France, continue their nuclear progress as they were not part of this treaty.
Moreover, the pursuit of MAD was considered blunt progress during the Cold War as it did not allow for a nuclear response, thereby limiting America’s nuclear progress. Also, the pursuit of nuclear progress by many states during this period made President Kennedy call for an international framework to halt proliferation, which was another political miscalculation. From these miscalculations, other global powers such as China and France, who did not join until 1992, were able to improve their nuclear arsenal compared to America, which was still concentrating on disarmament policies.
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