Specialisation: End-Of-Life Care

Death, Dying, and Euthanasia

The issue of death and dying presents complex ethical questions for healthcare providers, patients, and families. Chapter 6 of Thomas’ text examines two very different patient cases that illustrate the dilemmas surrounding end-of-life care and patient autonomy. In Case 6.1, Thomas details the contrasting situations of Carole, an older woman reliant on life support, and John, a young man with a debilitating disease who wishes to be taken off life support. Comparing these cases highlights several key issues, including differing perspectives on the value of life versus quality of life, the role of patient interests and consent, distinctions between the dying and not yet dying, and ethical differences between active and passive measures that may hasten death.

The first case describes Carole, an 81-year-old woman who has paralysis of her breathing muscles due to multiple cardiorespiratory arrests. She requires a respirator to stay alive and has no prospect of recovering her ability to breathe independently. Carole has minimal consciousness and is unable to participate in decisions about her care (Thomas et al., 2014). Her son insists she must remain on life support and be transported back to her native Jamaica before she dies, based on their shared religious beliefs about the afterlife. In contrast, the second case details the situation of 26-year-old John, who has battled a disfiguring neurological disease called neurofibromatosis his entire life. Despite over 100 surgeries, John is almost entirely paralyzed, deaf, and partially blind. He is conscious and mentally competent but relies on a respirator to breathe. John clearly expresses a wish to be taken off life support and allowed to die naturally. His family initially objects but eventually comes to accept his decision after counseling.

These two very different cases raise several ethical questions around patient autonomy, the moral status of life versus quality of life, and distinctions between actively or passively allowing death. The first significant issue is the sanctity of life versus quality of life. An absolute view of the sanctity of life would prohibit any action that intentionally ends a human life, including withdrawing treatment. However, a competing view holds that only lives possessing certain human qualities like rationality, self-awareness, and autonomy have inherent moral worth (Thomas et al., 2014). From this perspective, quality of life factors may override mere biological existence. For Carole, a rigid sanctity of life approach would require preserving her life at all costs. But this may paradoxically disrespect her remaining autonomy to shape end-of-life care. With John, ending his miserable and limited existence could be seen as showing greater respect for the value of his life than forcing him to endure unwanted treatments. However, abandoning the sanctity of life as a guiding principle raises concerns about protecting vulnerable patients. Overall, while the sanctity of life initially seems authoritative, it may conflict with patient wishes and best interests in complex cases like these.

A second key issue is how to weigh patient interests and consent. For Carole, consent is straightforward – neither she nor her son consent to withdrawing life support. The core question is whether patients have an unlimited right to access any treatment available, regardless of its costs or benefits. ICU care is very scarce and expensive, and continuing Carole’s dying process indefinitely deprives other patients. However, unilaterally refusing care due to futility or resource constraints seems callous and disrespectful (Thomas et al., 2014). With John, he clearly articulates a wish to stop treatment, but his family initially disagrees. Navigating this conflict raises concerns about patient autonomy versus familial authority. Counselors must balance their role as patient advocates with duties to promote health interests and support families. While respecting patient wishes is ideal, real-world resource limits and competing interests create ethical grey areas.

A third key question is whether it is morally different to withdraw care from a dying patient like Carole versus a more stable patient like John. Since death is imminent for Carole regardless, merely allowing it to proceed by stopping treatment could be acceptable. But John is not actively dying, so actively ending his life requires more substantial justification (Thomas et al., 2014). However, this distinction rests on dubious assumptions that existing life has the same status regardless of prognosis. If human life warrants protection intrinsically, this applies equally to relatively stable patients like John. But factors like avoiding unnecessary suffering are also ethically relevant. In reality, the dying/non-dying distinction is a simplistic dichotomy that does not accurately reflect complex medical realities.

Finally, there are debates around whether ethical distinctions exist between active versus passive measures that may result in death. Not resuscitating Carole allows the natural process of dying to occur, whereas removing John’s ventilator directly intervenes to cause his death. Some argue that active interventions to end life, like stopping life support, are ethically equivalent to killing (Thomas et al., 2014). However, others dispute that passively allowing nature to take its course differs meaningfully from direct actions that hasten death. With Carole, not saving her life may not vary much morally from withdrawing her ventilator. Moreover, “passive” approaches seem to inflict more suffering. With John, declining to end his life proactively painlessly seems hypocritical, given the acceptance of stopping his ventilator. Overall, while some view actively causing death as incompatible with healthcare’s healing aims, moral judgments should rest more on consequences than questionable distinctions between action and inaction.

Beyond the issues raised directly by Thomas, Beauchamp and Childress’ principles of biomedical ethics provide a valuable framework to analyze these cases. The principle of nonmaleficence supports not harming patients. Removing John’s ventilator breaches this principle by directly causing his death (Thomas et al., 2014). However, nonmaleficence must be balanced against competing principles like patient autonomy. The principle of autonomy supports respecting patients’ right to make decisions about their care. From this view, respecting John’s wish to stop treatment may supersede nonmaleficence. The principle of beneficence requires acting in patients’ best interests. However, applying beneficence is complex when patients have different views on benefit versus harm. Lastly, the principle of justice demands equitable distribution of care. Giving Carole scarce ICU resources regardless of medical benefit may deprive other patients in need. Overall, contextual analysis using ethical principles is essential.

In conclusion, end-of-life cases highlight multifaceted tensions in the ethical foundations of healthcare. The situations of Carole and John present no easy answers. Moving forward thoughtfully requires a nuanced examination of the value of life, patient interests, and distinctions between action and inaction. Open-minded discussion and debate around these complex issues are critical for developing ethically sound policies in our healthcare system.


Thomas, J. E., Waluchow, W. J., & Gedge, E. (Eds.). (2014). Well and Good-: A Case Study Approach to Health Care Ethics. Broadview Press.